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RECENT DECISION
Harris v. Rosario
by David C. Indiano*
Harry 0. Cookt
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Court for the District of Puerto Rico and the Supreme
Court of the United States have addressed fundamental issues concerning
the status of U.S. citizens who reside in Puerto Rico in the cases dis-
cussed below. Their handling of the disputes could not be more different.
The issues raised concern various sections of the Constitution which,
arguably, conflict as applied to Puerto Rico. Underlying these issues is a
significant political question-the status of Puerto Rico.
The following comment explores two such district court decisions
and the Supreme Court decisions which reversed them. Because of the
unique nature of the legal ties between the United States and Puerto
Rico, a discussion of the historical and legal setting of Puerto Rico is cru-
cial to a clear understanding of the controversies presented below.
The Controversies Involved
Ultimately the case raises the serious issue of the relationship of Puerto
Rico, and the United States citizens who reside there, to the
Constitution.1
Despite this claim by dissenting Justice Marshall, the Supreme
Court's two paragraph per curiam decision, Harris v. Rosario, held that
Congress may provide less federal financial assistance2 to Puerto Rico
than to the fifty states. The Court's decision reversed the holding of the
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University, 1981.
t J.D. Candidate, Georgetown University, 1981.
I Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 656 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 651. The program involved was the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-611 (1976). It provides federal financial assistance to states and
territories to aid families with needy dependent children. Under this program Puerto Rico
receives less assistance than do the states. Id. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1308(a)(1), 1396(b) (1975).
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District Court of Puerto Rico and is based primarily on Congressional
power under the Territorial Clause of the Constitution.$ The Court's rul-
ing, however, is complicated by the caveat that such discriminatory treat-
ment must be rationally based.4 As authority for this proposition, the
Court cites Califano v. Torres.5
An objective reading of Califano v. Torres leads one to the conclusion
that the decision was based on the Constitutional right to travel. The
federal involvement concerned the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
program.' In Califano v. Torres the plaintiffs brought an action against
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, claiming that the ex-
clusion of Puerto Rico in the amended definitional section of the SSI Act7
was unconstitutional in that it interfered with the right to travel of re-
sidents of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. As in Harris v.
Rosario, the Supreme Court reversed a finding for the plaintiffs in a deci-
sion by the District Court of Puerto Rico, Gautier Torres v. Mathews.8
Footnote seven in Califano v. Torres was used as grounds for reversal
in Harris v. Rosario. The footnote proposed three reasons to support its
position that, "so long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious,
the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy
are not subject to a constitutional straightjacket." 9 The reasons were ad-
vanced to explain the exclusion of persons in Puerto Rico from the SSI
program. The Court observed that (1) Puerto Rican residents do not con-
tribute tax dollars to the U.S. Treasury; (2) the cost to the federal govern-
ment would be high; and (3) extension of the program to Puerto Rico
might seriously disrupt the Puerto Rican economy.10
Califano v. Torres' footnote number four mentioned that the original
complaint had also alleged Fifth Amendment Due Process violations. The
Supreme Court, however, acknowledged that this was not a basis for the
lower court's decision. Perhaps this claim, and the issues presented by
Harris v. Rosario and Califano v. Torres, can be more fully understood by
briefly examining part of Puerto Rico's historical and legal background.
3 446 U.S. at 651-52; U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, empowers Congress to "make all
useful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory ... belonging to the United States."
4 446 U.S. at 651-52.
5 435 U.S. 1 (1978).
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1397 (1976).
7 Id. § 1382(f).
8 426 F. Supp. 1106 (D.P.R. 1977).
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972), quoted in Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S.
1, 5 (1978).
10 435 U.S. at 5 n.7.
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H. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL SETING
The island of Puerto Rico became part of the United States under
the terms of the Treaty of Paris,"' which put an end to the Spanish-
American War in 1898. Article IX of the Treaty gave the Congress the
power to determine the political status of the island. From 1898 until
1900, Puerto Rico was under military rule. The Foraker Act,12 passed in
1900, was the cornerstone of home rule for the island. This Act estab-
lished a civilian form of government headed by presidential appointees.
Under its terms, a legislative assembly was created; 3 a federal district
court was established in San Juan; 4 the island territory was exempted
from the federal internal revenue laws;15 and Puerto Rican citizenship
was recognized, thereby entitling the island to United States protection. 6
Additionally, Section 39 of the Act called for the election of a Resident
Commissioner to represent Puerto Rico in the U.S. Congress.1 7
The early decades of the 20th Century were characterized by the de-
velopment of Puerto Rico's political, social and economic institutions.
American citizenship was granted to Puerto Ricans under the terms of
the Organic Act of 1917, popularly known as the Jones Act., This Act
incorporated the major provisions of the Foraker Act, thus preserving the
territorial status of Puerto Rico. By the end of the second decade of the
20th Century, Puerto Ricans were American citizens governed by an up-
per echelon of presidential appointees and a popularly elected local legis-
lature. The next phase of home rule came in 1947 with the passage of the
Elective Governor Act,19 which allowed all qualified Puerto Rican voters
to elect their own governor.
The peak of the movement towards self government came in 1951
with the passage of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act,20 popularly
known as Law 600. Under the terms of this Act, the citizens of Puerto
Rico were permitted to draft their own state constitution which estab-
lished the framework of the island's local government. The major issue
- Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, United States-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343.
12 Ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (current version at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731-821 (1976).
13 Id. § 27.
" Id. § 34.
15 Id. § 14.
16 Id. § 7.
17 Id. § 39. The Resident Commissioner has similar powers and privileges as the Terri-
torial Delegate elected by the other American territories. As such, he may attend the ses-
sions of the House and the Senate but has no vote on the floor. See Transill, The Resident
Commissioner to the United States from Puerto Rico: An Historical Perspective, 47 REV.
Jur. U.P.R. 68 (1978).
" Ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (current version at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731-821 (1976).
Ch. 490, 6 Stat. 770 (1947) (repealed 1950).
20 48 U.S.C. §§ 731 b-e, 737, 752, 754, 821 (1976).
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concerning Law 600 is whether it actually changed Puerto Rico's legal
status vis-a-vis the United States.
As a result of Law 600, the "Estado Libre Asociado" or Common-
wealth status was bestowed .on Puerto Rico. Supposedly, this created a
new and unique relationship between the United States and the island.21
The Act granted Puerto Rico a degree of self-government never before
experienced by Puerto Ricans. But it does not necessarily follow that the
fundamental relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States
changed in a meaningful way. Indeed, a review of the Congressional Re-
cord and the relevant jurisprudence would suggest that this law is noth-
ing more than a cosmetic facelift as far as Puerto Rico's status is
concerned.
A review of Law 600 demonstrates that Puerto Rico's Constitution
drafters were subject to the same Congressional limitations imposed on
the states of the Union when they drafted their constitutions. Specifi-
cally, the constitution had to provide for a republican form of govern-
ment; the constitution had to be approved by the President and by the
Congress before becoming effective; and the document had to be in har-
mony with the U.S. Constitution and the provisions of Law 600.22
Other American Territories have been given the same right to draft
their own Constitution, yet it has not been claimed that they have estab-
lished a special relationship with the United States. Congress authorized
the people of Guam and the Virgin Islands to draft their own constitu-
tions within the existing territorial-federal relationship on October 21,
1976.3 The reality is that the people of Guam, Puerto Rico and the Vir-
gin Islands enjoy the same rights and benefits and are subject to the same
limitations. Each enjoys the same degree of self government, and each has
a U.S. Congressional delegate.
The Congressional Record provides further support for the conten-
tion that Law 600 did not change the status of Puerto Rico. During the
1950 House debate on S. 3336, which proposed a constitutional conven-
tion in Puerto Rico, the then Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico,
Antonio Fern6s Isern, stated that federal power over Puerto Rico would
continue undisturbed. 4 According to the Resident Commissioner, the
major purpose of S. 3336 was to give a constitutional basis to the local
21 Chief Justice Earl Warren called Commonwealth status "perhaps the most notable of
American political experiments in our lifetime." See Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Out of the Co-
lonial Closet, 33 FOREIGN POL'y 66, 78 (1978).
22 48 U.S.C. §§ 731 b-e, 737, 752, 774, 821 (1976). Law 600 reenacted the major sections
of the Jones Act and thus to that extent did nothing to change the basic relationship be-
tween the two countries.
13 Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Publ. L. No. 94-585, 90 Stat. 2899 (1976) (repealing 48 U.S.C.
§ 1391 (1917)).
24 96 CONG. REc. 9586 (1950) (remarks of Comm'r Fern6s Isern).
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government rather than a Congressional one.25
Fern6s Isern's remarks on the House floor served to reaffirm his ear-
lier statement of March 14, 1950 where he expressly stated that S. 3336
incorporated the provisions of the Jones Act.2" Although acknowledging
the Congressional power to act under the Territorial Clause of the Consti-
tution, Fern6s Isern believed that Puerto Rico's stage of development al-
lowed for Puerto Rican organization of a local government.27
Fern6s Isern's remarks come into clearer focus when one reads the
response of the late Governor Luis Mufioz Marin to a query as to whether
Puerto Ricans, after ratification of the constitution, would then proceed
to completely amend it as they pleased. Mufioz Marin responded:
You know of course, that if the people of Puerto Rico should go
crazy, Congress can always get around and legislate again. But I am con-
fident that the Puerto Ricans will not do that, and invite Congressional
legislation that would take back something that was given to the people
of Puerto Rico as good United States citizens.28
Mufioz Matin and Fern6s Isern felt that S. 3336 would give Puerto
Rico the right to establish and organize a local government suited to meet
local needs. Both politicans, however, expressly recognized that such local
government must exist within the federal framework and that Congress
would continue to wield ultimate power.
The passage of Law 600 afforded Puerto Ricans no new rights other
than the right to draft a constitution. Puerto Rican citizens are excluded
from voting representation in Congress, voting for President, and from
equal participation in federal programs and grants.29 In effect, this 1951
Act established nothing more than a local basis for laws which are always
subject to the power of Congress through the Territorial Clause. Mufioz
Marin and Fern6s Isern recognized this fact3 0 but chose to gloss over it
under the guise of "Estado Libre Asociado" or Commonwealth.
Although Puerto Rico experienced an economic and social boom from
the end of World War 11 until the early 1970's, the existence of a direct
link between Commonwealth status and the unprecedented period of
25 Id.
26 96 CONG. REc. 1898 app. (1950).
, Id. at 1899.
28 Helfeld, Congressional Intent and Attitude Toward Public Law 600 and the Consti-
tution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 21 REv. Ju. U.P.R. 255, 265 (1952).
18 Despite the fact that Puerto Ricans, and the residents of the other American territo-
ries for that matter, are excluded from voting for the President and full Congressional rep-
resentation, they are all subject to the selective service laws. For a discussion of the Puerto
Rican participation in the United States Armed Services, See Dfvila Col6n, The Blood Tax:
The Puerto Rican Contribution to the United States War Effort, 40 REV. C. ABo. P.R. 603
(1979).
20 Supra notes 26 and 28.
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growth has never been conclusively established. In fact, Federal Judge
Jos6 A. Cabranes, a prolific writer on the Commonwealth status, feels the
opposite is true. As Cabranes observed, "Puerto Rico's economic expan-
sion made possible the islanders' toleration of a political relationship with
the United States that was not fundamentally different from the overtly
colonial status that preceded it.""1
The retirement of Luis Mufioz Manin from public life in 1964,32 and
the resulting weakening of the once dominant Popular Democratic Party
(PDP), coupled with the end of the economic boom period in the early
1970's, has led to a growing dissatisfaction with the current state of af-
fairs. Puerto Ricans are now actively asserting their rights in forums as
diverse as the halls of Congress, the federal courts, and the United Na-
tions.33 This increased activism will ultimately lead to a showdown in the
coming decade as Puerto Ricans choose between statehood, independence
or a presently undefined form of autonomy. It is against this activism,
and the legal and political history of Puerto Rico, that Califano v. Torres
and Harris v. Rosario were decided.
III. THE DisTRicT AND SUPREME COURTS: USE OF PRECEDENT
A. The District Court Decisions
Further exploration of Califano v. Torres and Harris v. Rosario is
most effectively accomplished by first examining the overturned district
court decisions. At the outset, one must be aware of the tensions involved
here. The issue of extending federal funds to Puerto Rico is fraught with
political overtones. These two Puerto Rican district court decisions reveal
sensitivity to the underlying issue of whether Puerto Rican citizens
should be treated as equals of other U.S. citizens under the Constitution.
1. Gautier Torres v. Mathews
Prior to reaching what the district court defined as the real issue in
3' Cabranes, supra note 21, at 81.
32 Mufioz Matin tapped his Secretary of State, Roberto Sinchez Vilella, as his succes-
sor. Four years later, however, Mufloz Manin gave his support to Senator Luis Negr6n 1,-
pez. At a bitter and deeply divided party convention during the summer of 1968, L6pez was
nominated as the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) standard bearer. Sfinchez Vilella left the
PDP to run for reelection on the People's Party ticket. The division of the Commonwealth
forces led to the election of the first pro-statehood governor, Luis A. Ferr6. Since then, the
PDP has consistently lost support. For a review of the events surrounding Mufioz Main's
retirement from public office see, I. VELAZQUEZ, Mu Roz MARIN Y SANCHEZ VILMLLA (1974).
For a study of the issue of Puerto Rico's status as treated by the United Nations, see
generally, Axtmayer, Non-Self-Governing Territories and the Constitutive Process of the




Gautier Torres v. Mathews,; the court engaged in a discussion of the so-
called Insular Cases.3 5 These cases arose from the United States acquisi-
tion of various non-contiguous territories after the Spanish-American
War. Essentially, the issue presented by the Insular Cases was whether
the U.S. Constitution "followed the flag."3 6 Balzac v. Porto Rico,37 the
final Insular Case, created the doctrine of incorporated versus unincorpo-
rated territories. In the latter type of territories, those about which Con-
gress had not expressed an intention of eventual statehood, only "certain
fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution" were recog-
nized within their geographical confines.3 8
Most would agree that Balzac v. Porto Rico created an artificial dis-
tinction between these two alleged kinds of territories. Many argue that
the Balzac court exercised blatant judicial legislation. The district court
in Gautier Torres v. Mathews is highly critical of this distinction. 9 A
recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, however, Examining Board v.
Flores de Otero,40 seems to indicate that this doctrine is still very much
alive. In Gautier Torres v. Mathews the court admits that,
"[U]nfortunately, there are recent indications that the (Supreme) Court
has not yet seen fit to lay the cadaver of the Insular Cases to rest. [Ex-
amining Board v. Flores de Otero] . . . may very well have given new
warmth to this otherwise moribund corpse."' 1
Despite lengthy comments, the court states that the decision is not
concerned with the "alleged" power of Congress to establish disparate
treatment towards the U.S. citizens who reside in Puerto Rico, but rather
"whether a constitutional right of a citizen of -the United States [had]
been improperly penalized while he is within one of [the] States.''42 The
court begins its discussion of this issue by recognizing the fundamental
*4 426 F. Supp. 1106.
11 De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 224 (1901); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
"' 426 F. Supp. at 1108.
37 258 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1922).
" Id. at 312-13.
', 426 F. Supp. at 1109-10. The court refers to the Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 517
(1896), through Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), development and the cases
which deal with the application of the Constitution to civilians who accompany the armed
forces overseas in time of peace. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956); Kinsella v. Singleton,
361 U.S. 234 (1960); Gaisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. Guogliardo, 361
U.S. 281 (1960). These cases suggest that there may be grounds for reversal of the Insular
Cases.
40 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
"l 426 F. Supp. at 1109-10.
42 Id. at 1110.
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nature of the right to travel of all U.S. citizens. 43 The court then makes a
quantum leap by asserting that it can "perceive of no reason why the
standards which restrictive legislation must meet are not applicable with
equal vigor to any impingement upon travel from, as distinguished from
travel to a State."44 Having concluded that a violation of a fundamental
right of the plaintiff is involved, the court searches for a compelling gov-
ernmental interest to justify the infringement. Finding none, the district
court holds that the infringement is unjustified.45 Specifically, the court
rejects the government's contentions, which later are adopted by the Su-
preme Court in Harris v. Rosario."
It is important to note that Gautier Torres v. Mathews did not de-
cide whether it was constitutional to deny the above benefits to residents
of Puerto Rico. Its holding was limited to U.S. citizens who previously
were eligible for these benefits and thereafter travelled to the Island.
Dissenting Senior Circuit Judge McEntee commented on some of the
flaws in the preceding rationale. In his view, the right to travel was not at
issue.47 He would have defined the issue as whether Congress was re-
quired to extend any particular benefits to Puerto Rico. Noting that his-
torically this has never been the case, he would have rejected the plain-
tiff's contention.
2. Santiago Rosario v. Califano
In a lengthy Opinion and Order, the Federal District Court of Puerto
Rico decided Santiago Rosario v. Califano48 on Equal Protection grounds.
The federal assistance involved in this case was the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children Program49 [hereinafter AFDC]. Enacted in 1935,
AFDC was extended to Puerto Rico in 1950. A ceiling restriction and the
establishment of a different formula to allocate the federal funds was
needed to implement the program in Puerto Rico.50
The district court stated that there is no fundamental right to receive
more welfare aid, but that this was not at issue in the case.5 1 It did find
an Equal Protection issue:
[O]nce Congress has decided to grant the United States citizens certain
rights then the exclusion of some of those citizens from enjoying those
43 Id. at 1110-11.
44 Id. at 1111.
45 Id. at 1113.
46 446 U.S. at 651-52.
47 426 F. Supp. at 1113.
48 No. 77-301 (D.P.R. Oct. 1, 1979).
4, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-611.
50 Santiago Rosario v. Califano, No. 77-303, at 25.
51 Id. at 13.
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rights must be treated with suspicion not because the statutory right is
fundamental but because it is fundamental that United States citizens be
accorded the equal protection of the laws unless a compelling state inter-
est otherwise so dictates. Thus, it is the guarantee of equal protection
that is in itself the fundamental right involved.
52
Herein lies the crucial difference between the District Court's treat-
ment of the merits of this case and the subsequent Supreme Court resolu-
tion of the case. The District Court viewed the issue as one which con-
cerns an unjustifiable difference in treatment of certain U.S. citizens,
whereas the Supreme Court primarily focused on the plenary power of
Congress under the Territorial Clause. It is truly an example of courts
"passing in the night."
The "class," as seen by the District Court, is composed of U.S. citi-
zens who are residents of Puerto Rico. The government-defendant con-
tended that the exclusion was not intended to apply to residents of
Puerto Rico as a class. The exclusion also included U.S. citizens residing
in the Virgin Islands, Guam and American Somoa and was therefore
"geographically" based.53 The District Court rejected this distinction and
stated that,
[although] the exclusion applied is designed in terms of geographical ex-
clusion, the effect of the exclusion is on the American citizens who are
residents of Puerto Rico.5
The District Court specifically rejected points one and two of the
Califano v. Torres case 55 as sufficient to establish a compelling state in-
terest.56 Finding no compelling state interest, the district court held that
the class involved did not survive the constitutional "strict scrutiny
test. ' 57 Although Puerto Ricans do not pay federal income taxes, it
should be noted that Puerto Ricans do pay social security taxes.58 Both
Santiago Rosario v. Califano and Gautier Torres v. Califano address pro-
grams administered under the Social Security Act.59 Thus, the Supreme
Court's argument in Califano v. Torres60 that Puerto Rican residents do
not contribute tax dollars to the U.S. Treasury must be -seriously
questioned.
:2 Id.
3' Id. at 18.
5Id.
435 U.S. at 5 n.7.
Santiago Rosario v. Califano, No. 77-303, at 19-20.
7 Id. at 14.
8 Id. at 20.
:9 Id. at 1; Gautier Torres v. Mathews, 436 F. Supp. at 1107.
0 435 U.S. at 5 n.7.
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B. The Supreme Court Decisions
1. Califano v. Torres.
As suggested earlier, this case rested on the constitutional right to
travel. The Supreme Court was unwilling to concur with the district
court's expansive reading of this right. The Supreme Court contended
that this would effectively give one who travels to Puerto Rico "superior
benefits to those enjoyed by other residents of Puerto Rico if the new-
comer enjoyed those benefits in the State from which he came." '81
2. Harris v. Santiago Rosario
The briefs of the parties which were submitted to the Supreme Court
in this case shed some light on the tensions involved. The appellee's brief
predictably emphasized the Equal Protection claim upon which the dis-
trict court had decided in their favor.6 2 It systematically rejected various
reasons proposed by the government which allegedly justify the unequal
treatment.6 3 The appellee's brief also rejected the appellant's contention
that Califano v. Torres was decisive since it did not foreclose the Equal
Protection question." As authority, appellee cited a First Circuit Court
opinion which supported this interpretation of Califano v. Torres.65 The
appellee also attempted to diminish the impact of the Territorial Clause
by pointing to cases which question any expansive reading of this clause,
and by trying to focus the issue on treatment of U.S. citizens residing in
Puerto Rico, rather than upon Puerto Rico as a political entity.6 6
The appellant's brief treated the issues more summarily. Appellant
contended that there is no Equal Protection issue because there was no
suspect class, only a "classification based solely on geography and on the
unique legal and historical relationship between the United States and its
territories. '8 7 Cases supporting a more expansive reading of the Territo-
rial Clause were cited."
Few of the people involved with this legal proceeding anticipated a
per curiam resolution of such a fundamentally important issue. The Su-
preme Court grounded its opinion squarely and succintly on the Territo-
rial Clause and the three footnoted "rational bases" for differential treat-
ment as established in the Califano v. Torres case. Assuming, arguendo,
61 Id. at 4.
62 Brief for Appellee at 6, 10, Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980).
63 Id. at 21-31.
Id. at 8-10.
See, Molina-Crespo v. Califano, 583 F.2d 572, 574 (1st Cir. 1978).
6: Supra, note 62 at 15.
67 Brief for appellant at 10-11, Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980).
68 Id. at 11.
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that the three rational bases test in footnote seven of Califano v. Torres
may be considered dicta, the Supreme Court may be willing to rest solely
on the Territorial Clause in its current treatment of U.S. citizens in
Puerto Rico.
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court and the Supreme Court appear very result-
oriented in the resolution of these cases. In Gautier Torres v. Califano,
the right to travel was hyperextended to achieve the goal of equal treat-
ment. The district court was clearly more interested in discrediting the
Insular Cases, which had supplied some precedent for such unequal
treatment. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Harris v. Rosario misused
precedent. Califano v. Torres is not solid authority for the broad proposi-
tion which the Court sets forth in Harris v. Rosario.
The Supreme Court's far-reaching application of the Territorial
Clause to Puerto Rico is mildly disturbing. Under the Territorial Clause,
it would appear that Congress is granted a "blank check" over the territo-
ries and the U.S. citizens who reside there. It would seem that this clause,
to the extent that it allows for differential treatment of citizens, is
squarely at odds with the civil rights cases of the past decades which rec-
ognize no difference in degrees of citizenship. The Court's attempt to
gloss over this fact by finding a rational basis for unequal treatment fails
to settle the serious issue of the relationship between the territories, their
residents, and the Constitution. Given the train of events in Puerto Rico,
it may well be that the Court will face the issue again in the near future.
This leaves the essentially political question of Puerto Rico's status.
The entire concept of a "Commonwealth" being something other than a
territory is one whose day seems to be coming to an end.69 Clearly, the
Supreme Court's Harris v. Rosario decision has dashed the hopes of those
who support the Commonwealth status in Puerto Rico that the Supreme
Court will be the instrument by which Puerto Rico's "unique" status will
translate into some legal entity other than a territory.
" Politically, the impact of this case has been beneficial to the Statehood Party in
Puerto Rico. During his July 4th, 1980 address, Governor Romero Barcel6 said that Puerto
Rico, "remain[s], under commonwealth, exactly what we always said under the Jones Act: a
territory, and [Puerto Ricans are] second-class American citizen[s]." San Juan Star (P.R.),
July 5, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
1980

